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ONE TRILOGY THAT SHOULD GO WITHOUT
A SEQUEL:
WHY THE BASEBALL ANTITRUST
EXEMPTION SHOULD BE REPEALED
BRITTANY VAN Roo*
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 29, 1922, Justice Holmes delivered an opinion that would change
the world of baseball for decades to come. In Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, Holmes
concluded that the business of professional baseball was not interstate
commerce and, therefore, did not come within the reach of federal antitrust
laws.' Hence, the baseball antitrust exemption was born, and even though it
has been limited over the past eighty-eight years by other monumental
decisions and congressional action, the fact remains today that Major League
Baseball (MLB) is exempt from antitrust regulation. 2
Justice Holmes's decision was based upon a separation of the actual
exhibition of the baseball game itself and the business side of the sport. 3 In
the years since the Federal Baseball decision, technology has developed, and
the exhibition side of baseball has become increasingly dependent on the
business side, often bringing the antitrust exemption under attack.'
Nonetheless, Holmes's decision has been upheld every time.5 However, the
door does appear to have been left open just a crack, despite the exemption
being upheld. In Gardella v. Chandler6 and Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v.
* Brittany Van Roo received her J.D. from Marquette University Law School, where she was also
a May 2010 recipient of a Sports Law Certificate from the National Sports Law Institute.
This Article won the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School's 2010
National Sports Law Student Writing Competition.
1. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat'l League of Prof 1 Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209
(1922).
2. See generally id.; Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258 (1972); Application of the Antitrust Laws to Professional Major League Baseball Act, 15
U.S.C.A. § 26b (2010).
3. Fed, Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
4. See Flood, 407 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1972).
5. Id. at 285.
6. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 404 (2d Cir. 1949).
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Houston Sports Ass'n,7 the approach of the respective courts was to
distinguish the cases before them from the situation in Federal Baseball in an
attempt to reach a different outcome. Despite these and similar decisions, the
MLB antitrust exemption has stood strong. In light of recent developments
within the industry, the question remains whether this will be the case for
much longer.
In 2007, MLB entered into a five-year deal with StubHub, Inc. (StubHub),
making the website the exclusive online secondary ticket seller of the league.8
Although the deal does not mandate that clubs use StubHub, if they do not use
that specific site, they are then prohibited from reselling their tickets online.9
The deal has dire consequences for other online ticket resellers, such as
Ticketmaster, that had previously contracted with clubs to handle their ticket
reselling needs.' 0 With arguably such severe potential restraints on trade, an
analysis of the possible antitrust implications is appropriate. This article sets
out to do just that.
First, the antitrust exemption will be examined so as to define its purposes
and analyze the reasons behind its development. Second, the article will look
to various cases and congressional measures in order to analyze how changes
in the business of baseball that have occurred since the days of Federal
Baseball have affected how the antitrust issue is approached. Finally, in light
of developments made within the baseball industry, this article will explore
whether the MLB-StubHub deal is likely to be seen as taking the antitrust
exemption too far. This could be the proverbial straw that breaks the camel's
back. In other words, an in-depth antitrust analysis of the StubHub situation
may finally persuade either Congress or the Supreme Court to make the first
move and repeal the baseball antitrust exemption.
A. The History ofAntitrust Regulation
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) with
the purpose of promoting competition and protecting consumers from
anticompetitive practices in interstate commerce.II The Sherman Act was
7. Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 270-71 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
8. Rachel Konrad, StubHub, MLB Enter Ticket Resale Pact, USATODAY.COM, Aug. 2, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2007-08-02-2406372049_x.htm.
9. Id.
10. Brad Stone & Matt Richtel, Baseball Gets Into Resale of Tickets, NYTIMES.COM, Aug. 1,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/02/business/02tickets.html
11. Jarod Gonzalez, Note, Antitrust Law: A Long Time Coming - United States Supreme Court
Adopts the "Rule ofReason" Test for Vertical Maximum Price Fixing Cases in State Oil Co. v. Khan,
52 OKLA. L. REV. 645, 645 (1999).
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born out of a need to regulate those companies with a majority of the
economic power and prevent the abuse of such power.12 Looking at the
statutory language itself, as well as the history of its development, will aid the
analysis of how the statute is applied to sports, specifically MLB.
Through sections one and two, the Sherman Act makes illegal those
collective actions that unreasonably restrain trade, as well as monopolization
and attempted monopolization.13 Specifically, section one reads:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to
be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to
be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $
1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 14
Thus, to bring a successful claim under section one, the claimant must
show that there exists (1) concerted action that (2) unreasonably restrains (3)
interstate commerce. 15 When a court is faced with a question as to whether an
unreasonable restraint has been placed on trade or commerce, it can choose to
undertake one or both of two methods. 16
The first is the "rule of reason" method. 17 Under this method, a court
undergoes an in-depth analysis of the questioned concerted action. 18 Most
agreements and contracts involve such convoluted provisions that a clear
restraint on competition is difficult to find. 19 As such, the Supreme Court held
that "[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
12. Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under the Sherman Act, 30 CAP. U.L.
REv. 125, 126-27 (2002).
13. MATTHEW MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, &
PROBLEMS, 238-39 (2d ed. 2009).
14. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2010).
15. Anderson, supra note 12, at 128.
16. See id
17. Id at 128-29.
18. Id
19. See id
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such as may suppress or even destroy competition." 20 Once the plaintiff
successfully shows that there has been a restraint on trade and that the restraint
has had an anticompetitive effect, the defendant must then demonstrate that
there are actually pro-competitive reasons for said restraint. 21 The plaintiff
will likely be successful if he or she can then show that the restraint imposed
by the defendant is too harsh or that it is not reasonably necessary to
accomplish the sought after pro-competitive effects. 22
The second method is the "per se" method, which provides for a more
expedient approach.23 The Supreme Court said "there are certain agreements
or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack
of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use." 24
Agreements that involve price fixing or market allocation are typically
those to which courts will apply the per se analysis because of the clearly
anticompetitive consequences. 25 The Supreme Court cautions, however, "a
new per se rule is not justified until the judiciary obtains considerable rule-of-
reason experience with the particular type of restraint challenged." 26 Also,
this per se analysis method has been deemed inappropriate for use in analyzing
claims brought under section two of the Sherman Act.27
Section two of the Sherman Antitrust Act states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $ 1,000,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
20. Bd. of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
21. Anderson, supra note 12, at 130.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 129.
24. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
25. JONATHAN M. JACOBSON, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 47-48 (6th ed. 2007).
26. Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 n.19 (1982).
27. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
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discretion of the court. 28
There are certain agreements that are more unilateral and involve a single
entity, and therefore, "such combinations are judged under a rule of reason, an
inquiry into market power and market structure designed to assess the
combination's actual effect." 29 Unilateral activity does not pose as much of a
risk of anti-competitiveness as concerted activity, and as such, the rule of
reason has been deemed a much more appropriate method of analysis for
section two claims. 30
This decreased threat of anti-competitiveness associated with unilateral
activity stems from the requirement for single entities to maintain a certain
level of internal cohesiveness to properly function. 3 1 Congress did not want to
discourage these entities with potential antitrust claims; thus, a plaintiff
bringing a claim under section two must show that there is a threat of actual
monopolization. 32 However, having monopoly power does not necessarily
mean that the entity is in violation of antitrust laws. 33 The plaintiff has to
further prove that said monopoly power was obtained through "improper[] or
predatory means." 34
The difficulty involved in proving the section two elements, as well as a
history of unsuccessful section two challenges to league conduct, 35 makes
scrutiny under section two comparatively preferable to sports leagues than that
under section one. 36 Subsequently, sports leagues often argue that they are
single entities "incapable of conspiring or agreeing with [themselves]," and
therefore, they are not subject to scrutiny under section one. 37
28. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §2 (2010).
29. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768.
30. Id
31. See id. at 767-69.
32. Id at 767.
33. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979).
34. Anderson, supra note 12, at 128 n.32.
35. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 781-87 (3d Cir. 1983)
(finding that plaintiffs did not show actual or potential injury to competition resulting from the
rejection of their application for a professional football franchise); Am. Football League v. Nat'l
Football League, 323 F.2d 124, 130-34 (4th Cir. 1963) (finding that defendants did not have the
power to impede formation of plaintiffs' league); S.F. Seals, Ltd. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 379 F.
Supp. 966, 971-72 (D.C. Cal. 1974) (denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment due to lack of
standing).
36. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 137 n.112.
37. Id. at 131.
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B. The Single Entity Defense
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the petitioner
successfully argued that its conduct was justified through the single entity
defense. 38 The Supreme Court determined that a corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary were incapable of conspiring with each other, rendering the
application of section one of the Sherman Act inappropriate. 39 Thus, when
American Needle, Inc. (American Needle) sued the National Football League
(NFL) in 2008 for various antitrust violations, the NFL subsequently relied on
this Copperweld decision in arguing that the League was similarly immune
from liability. 40
In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, the defendant
league had granted licenses to numerous vendors, including the plaintiff, to
manufacture headwear.4 1 American Needle had held its license for over
twenty years when, in 2000, NFL Properties solicited bids from its multiple
headwear vendors for an exclusive license.42 Reebok won the bidding war
and the other vendors' licenses were, therefore, not renewed. 43 American
Needle sued the NFL alleging that the individual NFL teams had conspired
with NFL Properties in awarding the exclusive license to Reebok, thereby
violating section one of the Sherman Act." The plaintiffs also brought a
section two claim, alleging that the NFL teams were trying to monopolize the
licensing and wholesale product markets.45 The NFL defendants responded to
the plaintiffs' claims by filing a motion for summary judgment.46 The NFL
argued it was immune from section one liability pursuant to the Copperweld
decision.47 More specifically, the defendants contended "they functioned as a
single entity when collectively promoting NFL football by licensing the NFL
teams' intellectual property, and were thus immune from liability under
[section one]."4 8 The district court determined that the defendants were, in
fact, acting as a single economic unit and concluded that "they have so
38. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 776-77 (1984).
39. Id. at 777.
40. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2008).
41. Id
42. Id
43. Id
44. Id
45. Id
46. Id
47. Id
48. Id at 739.
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integrated their operations that they should be deemed to be a single entity." 49
The defendants' summary judgment motion was also granted as to the section
two claim because, as a single entity, they could "collectively license their
intellectual property . . . 'without running afoul of the antitrust laws."' 50 On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, and in 2009,
the Supreme Court granted American Needle's petition for writ of certiorari. 51
Finally, on May 24, 2010, American Needle's efforts prevailed, as the
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decision and concluded that the
actions of the individual NFL teams and NFL Properties constituted concerted
action.5 2 Although the defendants' arguments were at one point convincing,
the Court ultimately decided that "[t]hirty-two teams operating independently
through the vehicle of the [NFL Properties] are not like the components of a
single firm that act to maximize the firm's profits. The teams remain
separately controlled, potential competitors with economic interests that are
distinct from [NFL Properties's] financial well-being."53
As exemplified by this American Needle case, courts continue to apply the
Copperweld approach only to situations involving entities that "share a
complete unity of interest and purpose, or when one firm exercises complete
control over the other." 54 As such, the traditional, more established sports
leagues typically fail in attempting to be viewed as a single entity.55 Although
the NFL in American Needle argued otherwise, it is typically the case that
"sports leagues raise numerous difficult antitrust questions . . . . The very
concept of a league involving separate business entities (teams) requires
concerted behavior among them and the exclusion of outsiders."56 In taking
notice of these surrounding antitrust issues, some newer leagues, including
Major League Soccer, the Women's National Basketball Association, and the
American Basketball League, have made a conscious decision to try to form
themselves as single-entities from the very beginning.58  Unfortunately, this
approach still fails to completely avoid antitrust challenges, as players
49. Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff'd,
sub. nom., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009).
50. Am. Needle, Inc., 538 F.3d at 740.
51. Am. Needle, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 2859.
52 Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010).
53Id.
54 Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense
ofthe Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 35 (1991).
Anderson, supra note 12, at 132.
56 U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1372 (2d Cir. 1988).
s7 Anderson, supra note 12, at n.60.
" Id. at 132.
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continue to challenge league conduct under the antitrust laws. 59
C. Antitrust Exemptions
Besides the single entity defense, another way a party avoids being subject
to antitrust regulation is if its industry has been exempted from antitrust
scrutiny. 60 "[W]here the federal, state, and local governments have adopted
economic or social policies that conflict with free and open competition,
accommodations [have been] made between the demands of the antitrust laws
and the constraints of those other goals." 61 These accommodations usually
come in the form of an exemption, and an important vehicle for implementing
these exemptions is the Clayton Act.62
Section six of the Clayton Act explicitly states that "[t]he labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce." 63 Thus, because it would
not make sense to allow employers to rely on antitrust law to deny rights
granted by labor law, the Clayton Act effectively provides labor unions with
immunity from antitrust liability. 64  This means that, when a union
collectively bargains over "issues of wages, hours, and conditions of
employment as well as strikes, picketing and boycotts of employers," it is not
violating the antitrust laws. 65  The courts expanded upon this statutory
exemption, which protects only unilateral conduct, when they created the
nonstatutory exemption to protect the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement involved. 66 While Congress chose to provide the labor market and
certain other industries with antitrust immunity, the Supreme Court, through a
trilogy of landmark decisions, chose to do the same with professional
baseball.67
5 See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 180 F.R.D. 178 (D. Mass. 1998).
60. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 133.
61. ABA, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1069 (4th ed. 1997).
62. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29, 52-53 (2010); Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal
Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J.
19, 21-22,26-29 (1986).
63. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2010).
64. MITTEN, supra note 13, at 437.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See generally Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof I Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200; Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258 (1972).
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D. The Great Trilogy Gives Birth to the Baseball Antitrust Exemption
Although the amount of case law involving baseball and the antitrust
exemption is almost overwhelming, the creation of the exemption itself can be
narrowed down to three major decisions that came to be known as the
"trilogy."68
The first case of this trilogy was Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc.
v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.69 In 1922, the Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore brought an antitrust suit against the National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs. 70 The plaintiff argued that the defendants had
conspired to monopolize the business of baseball by purchasing all the other
clubs in the plaintiffs former league, thereby inducing those clubs to leave
that league. 71 Justice Holmes stated that the business of baseball was to be
kept separate from the actual exhibition of the game itself, which was entirely
a state affair. 72 Although it was true that, in order for the baseball games to
take place, traveling between states was necessary, "the fact that in order to
give the exhibitions the Leagues [had to] induce free persons to cross state
lines and [had to] arrange and pay for their doing so [was] not enough to
change the character of the business." 73 The Court concluded that human
effort was not a subject of commerce, and it was not transformed into such
simply due to incidental travel among the States. 74 The defendants' conduct
was determined not to be within the coverage of the Sherman Act,75 and thus,
the baseball antitrust exemption was born.76
The Supreme Court sought to reevaluate its Federal Baseball holding
nearly thirty years later in the second part of the trilogy, Toolson v. New York
Yankees. 77 In 1951, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, as a result of
their monopolistic practices, had deprived him of his livelihood. 78 The
Newark International Baseball Club had assigned his contract to the
68. Anderson, supra note 12, at 133-35.
69. See generally Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 200.
70. Id. at 207.
71. Id.
72. Id at 208.
73. Id. at 208-09.
74. Id at 209.
75. Id at 208.
76. See id.
77. See generally Toolson vs. N.Y. Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd, 346 U.S.
356 (1953).
78. Id. at 93.
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Binghamton Exhibition Company, Inc., and when the plaintiff refused to go to
the new club, he was deemed ineligible and was forbidden from playing
professional baseball. 79 Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
Federal Baseball decision had been made thirty years prior to the case at hand,
the Court also pointed out that the baseball industry had been allowed to
develop all these years under the understanding that it was exempt from the
antitrust laws and that Congress "[had] not seen fit to bring such business
under [the antitrust laws] by legislation . . ." 80 If the industry had changed
enough to now warrant the antitrust laws applicable, then Congress should be
the entity to make such change through legislation.8'
The Supreme Court had yet another chance to reassess the legal status of
professional baseball in Flood v. Kuhn.82 Curt Flood had been traded to the
Philadelphia Phillies without his consent and subsequently brought an antitrust
suit against, among others, the Commissioner of Baseball, Bowie Kuhn.8 3 He
alleged that professional baseball's reserve clause was unfair and violated the
federal antitrust laws. 84  Justice Blackmun conceded in the opinion that
"[p]rofessional baseball [was] a business and it [was] engaged in interstate
commerce" and that "Federal Baseball and Toolson [had] become an
aberration confined to baseball."85 However, he also admitted that because of
the retroactivity concerns, the Court had been reluctant to make any changes
and reiterated that, if changes did in fact need to be made, Congress was to do
so through legislation. 86 This final case of the trilogy upheld the 1922 holding
of Federal Baseball and, thus, established and solidified what is now known
as the baseball antitrust exemption.
E. The Antitrust Exemption Stands Strong
After the Supreme Court established that it was unwilling to tamper with
precedent, other courts followed in its path. The appellant in Portland
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc. argued that "the
conditions of restraint in professional baseball [were] now more aggravated
than at the times of [Federal Baseball] ... and [Toolson]."87 The Court of
79. Id.
80. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
81. Id.
82. See generally Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
83. Id at 265.
84. Id at 265-66.
85. Id. at 282.
86. Id at 283-84.
87. Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 282 F.2d 680, 680 (9th Cir.
[Vol. 21:1390
2010] TRILOGY THAT SHOULD GO WITHOUT A SEQUEL
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit simply stated that the Supreme Court was still
waiting on Congress to bring professional baseball within the gamut of federal
antitrust regulation.88
Undergoing a much more thorough analysis, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin took on its own antitrust suit in 1966.89 After the Boston Braves
moved to Milwaukee in 1953, attendance at the then newly constructed
County Stadium skyrocketed. 90 At the end of the 1964 season, the board of
directors decided it wanted to transfer the team to Atlanta, and after this
became public news, attendance dropped along with the team's performance
on the field.91 The State of Wisconsin sued the Milwaukee Braves, alleging
that they, along with other members of the National League, had created a
monopoly and had "intended to and would restrain and prevent various types
of trade and commerce involved in major league baseball in Milwaukee." 92
The court again acknowledged the "long continued reliance on Federal
Baseball and the policy reasoning of the [S]upreme [C]ourt that any change
should be brought about by legislation." 93 Thus, the court concluded that,
because of the exemption from the federal antitrust laws, the state antitrust
laws could also not be applied to the defendants' conduct. 94
Although a significant amount of case law demonstrates a reluctance to
disturb the baseball exemption, many courts have attempted to avoid applying
the exemption by reanalyzing the trilogy's holdings and focusing on the
developments of baseball since 1922. One such case was that of Gardella v.
Chandler.95
Appellant played professional baseball for the New York Giants, and
while under contract, he also played professional baseball in Mexico, thereby
violating the reserve clause from his initial contract. 96 He was barred from
playing professional baseball and subsequently sued the Commissioner of
Baseball for alleged violations of the antitrust laws.97 The district court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that neither party
1960).
88. Id.
89. See generally State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d I (Wis. 1966).
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 14.
94. Id. at 18.
95. See generally Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), rev'd, 172 F.2d 402
(2d Cir. 1949).
96. Id at 261-62.
97. Id
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was engaged in interstate trade or commerce. 98 In reversing that decision,
Judge Frank agreed with the holding in Federal Baseball that mere travel was
insufficient to establish "interstate commerce" but concluded that "here there
[was] substantial interstate commerce of a sort not considered by the Court in
the [Federal Baseball] case." 99 He pointed out that the communication of the
games "by radio and television [was] in no way a means, incidental or
otherwise, of performing the intra-state activities (the local playings of the
games)." 00 In Federal Baseball, "the traveling was but a means to the end of
playing games which themselves took place intra-state; here the games
themselves, because of the radio and television, [were], so to speak, played
interstate as well as intra-state." 01 Thus, he determined that the defendant's
conduct should come under the coverage of the Sherman Act, and the court
remanded the case back to the district court for adjudication.102
Gardella v. Chandler demonstrated how technology's developing
relationship with professional baseball was slowly beginning to weaken the
argument for applying the antitrust exemption. 103 Another such case was that
of Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n.104 In that case,
the plaintiff radio station brought an antitrust suit after the defendant, Houston
Sports Association, owner of the Houston Astros baseball club, cancelled its
contract with the plaintiff and allegedly conspired with the defendant radio
station, KENR, to control the radio market. 0 5 The ultimate question was
whether radio broadcasting was "so much a part of baseball that it, as well as
baseball, is exempt from the antitrust laws."' 06 Questioning the Supreme
Court's reasoning behind upholding the exemption, Judge McDonald stated
that it "would seem to be that the broadcasting is not central enough to the
'unique characteristics and needs' of baseball which the exemption was
created to protect, to affect that exemption." 0 7 Broadcasting is not as integral
to the sport as the players and umpires, but despite this, Judge McDonald
admitted that the more reasonable interpretation of the exemption is that it is
98. Id. at 263.
99. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402,411 (2d Cir. 1949).
100. Id. at 411.
101. Id
102. Id. at 414-15.
103. See generally id.
104. See generally Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.
Tex. 1982).
105. Id. at 264.
106. Id. at 268.
107. Id. at 268-69.
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an aberration.108  "[C]hanges in the economics of the sport even since
Toolson, especially the increasing importance of revenues from interstate
television broadcasts, make baseball's immunity from the antitrust laws more
anomlous [sic] than ever."109 The defendants in this case made no argument
to extend the exemption, and as such, their motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction was denied.110 Although this court acknowledged the limits of the
baseball exemption, the fact is that the exemption itself remained relatively
unscathed, ready to be utilized.
F. Time to Step Up to the Plate
With all these subsequent limitations and the willing acknowledgment that
baseball has changed since Federal Baseball, it is hard to understand why the
exemption still remains. From the relevant case law the answer appears to be
quite clear: neither Congress nor the Supreme Court wants to make the first
move.
In 1957, fifteen years before Flood, the Supreme Court, in fact, admitted
the error made in its Federal Baseball decision.11' In Radovich v. National
Football League, the petitioner football player alleged that the respondent
football league and its club members had conspired to monopolize and control
organized professional football in violation of the Sherman Act. 112  The
respondents argued that the exemption established in Federal Baseball was
applicable to all team sports, but the Court, here, did not agree.' 13 The Court
emphasized language from the baseball antitrust cases and concluded that the
exemption's application was limited to baseball. 114  Even that is now
suspect."' Questioning its own rationale in Federal Baseball, the Court
stated that the ruling was "unrealistic, inconsistent, [and] illogical. . .. "116
The Court admitted that, if it were deciding the Federal Baseball case here for
the first time, the outcome would have been different.117 Although it was
deemed inapplicable in this case, the exemption nevertheless remained
108. Id. at 269.
109. Id. at 271(quoting Salerno v. Am. League of Prof 1 Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d
Cir. 1970)).
110. Id. at 271-72.
111. See Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957).
112. Id at 446-47.
113. Id. at 447-48.
114. Id at 451-52.
115. Id. at 452.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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intact. 118
Five years prior to Radovich, before Toolson reached the Supreme Court,
several bills came before Congress that proposed to completely exempt
professional baseball, football, basketball, and hockey from antitrust
regulation.11 9 The House Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power
conducted detailed hearings discussing these bills and stated in its report that
the bills had been introduced "by friends of baseball because they feared that
the continued existence of organized baseball as America's national pastime
was in substantial danger by the threat of impending litigation." 20 In this
1952 House Subcommittee Report No. 2002, entitled "Organized Baseball,"
the Subcommittee concluded that to extend the exemption in such a manner
would "no longer require competition in any facet of business activity of any
sport enterprise."'21 In Henderson Broadcasting Corp., Judge McDonald
pointed out that, through this report, Congress had explicitly "recognized that
professional organized sports are involved in extraneous business activities"
and that "an extension of the baseball exemption to other activities as well as
to other sports would contravene the federal antitrust laws." 22 Seeing as
"[t]he Subcommittee recommended against enactment of legislation on
baseball, pending judicial interpretation of Federal Baseball," Congress
refused to extend the exemption to other activities.123
While Congress awaited judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court
awaited Congressional action. In Flood v. Kuhn, Justice Blackmun noted that
"Federal Baseball and Toolson [had] become an aberration confined to
baseball." 24 Also, "[s]ince Toolson [had been decided,] more than 50 bills
[had] been introduced in Congress relative to the applicability or
nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to baseball." 25 However, none had been
enacted, and it was determined that Congress, through its silence,
demonstrated no such intention to subject baseball to antitrust regulation.126
Congress had knowingly allowed the exemption to survive for years, so the
Court's stance became one of "positive inaction." 27  Therefore, Justice
118. Id.
119. Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional Baseball's Exemption
from the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. PIr. L. REv. 209, 215 (1983).
120. H. R. REP. No. 82-2002, at 1 (1952).
121. Id. at 230.
122. Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 269 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
123. Id.
124. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
125. Id. at 281.
126. Id at 283.
127. Id at 283-284.
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Blackmun concluded that "what the Court said in Federal Baseball in 1922
and what it said in Toolson in 1953, we say again here in 1972: the remedy, if
any is indicated, is for congressional, and not judicial, action." 128
Congress had another chance in 1993 when a bill was introduced to the
Senate entitled the Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1993.129
Senator Metzenbaum said that "it [was] in the best interest of the public, the
fans, and the sport of baseball" to remove the exemption and that was exactly
what the Reform Act was supposed to do.130 Unfortunately, in 1994, the bill
was defeated by a Senate Judiciary Committee vote of 7-10.131
Although it appeared that professional baseball would forever be chained
to the holdings of the trilogy, to appease both the players association and club
owners, Congress enacted The Curt Flood Act of 1998.132 The Curt Flood
Act provides MLB players with the same type of antitrust remedies as other
professional athletes,133 thereby limiting the scope of the once completely
impenetrable force known as the antitrust exemption. 134 However, section (b)
of the Curt Flood Act explicitly states that "[n]o court shall rely on the
enactment of this section as a basis for changing the application of the antitrust
laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than those set forth in
subsection (a)."' 35 In other words, if the questionable conduct does not
involve the "employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
the major league level,"' 36 then the antitrust exemption still applies.137
The baseball antitrust exemption and its supporting cases have been so
frequently recognized as inconsistent and illogical that it is inevitable that
either the Supreme Court or Congress is going to have to step up to the plate
128. Id. at 285.
129. Kathleen L. Turland, Note, Major League Baseball and Antitrust: Bottom of the Ninth,
Bases Loaded, Two Outs, Full Count and Congress Takes a Swing, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1329, 1363
(1995).
130. Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1993, 139 CONG. REC. S2416 (daily ed.
March 4, 1993)(statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
131. KENNETH M. JENNINGS, SWINGS AND MISSES: MORIBUND LABOR RELATIONS IN
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL 89 (1997).
132. Roger 1. Abrams, The Curt Flood Act: Before the Flood: The History of Baseball's Antitrust
Exemption, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 307, 313 (1999).
133. The Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) (2010).
134. Andrew E. Borteck, Note, The Faux Fix, Why a Repeal of Major League Baseball's
Antitrust Exemption Would Not Solve its Severe Competitive Balance Problems, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1069,1081 n.68 (2004).
135. 15 U.S.C. at § 26b(b).
136. Id. § 26b(a).
137. Borteck, supra note 134, at 1081.
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and confront the issue head-on.138 Congress has made numerous attempts to
lift the exemption or at least limit its application, yet it still has been reluctant
to enact a law without further clarification from the Supreme Court of the
exact scope of the exemption.139  Subsequently, it appears that another
Federal Baseball-type of judicial analysis is called for.
In 1957, it was determined that the status of professional baseball had
changed since 1922,140 so it is logical to assume that, after another fifty years,
the status of professional baseball has changed exponentially. In light of the
technological advances and various contractual maneuvers made by MLB
clubs, specifically the recent ticket reselling deal struck between MLB and
StubHub, such an analysis is necessary, as it now appears unlikely that one
could successfully argue that professional baseball is not interstate commerce.
G. Getting into the Game of Ticket Scalping
Ticket scalping, also known as ticket reselling, is defined as:
[T]he process of legitimately purchasing a ticket (or large
numbers of tickets) from a primary seller such as an off-site
box office, the arena or venue, or the team or league office
and then reselling the tickets on the street for more money.
The intent is to profit from the difference in price.141
The practice of ticket scalping is one that has been criticized for years.142
Opponents of the practice argue that it not only obstructs those who wish to
attend sporting events from having equal access to tickets but, also, that it
invades the legitimate interest the sports team or league has in regulating ticket
sales and controlling business activity.143 In an attempt to curb such issues
associated with ticket scalping, many states have adopted laws regulating the
practice.144 Nevertheless, the ticket scalping industry is a tremendously
lucrative one. 14 It has been roughly estimated that "the scalping industry
138. See Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues
Revisited: Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 729, 769 (1987).
139. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972); Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports
Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 269 (S.D. Tex. 1982); JENNINGS, supra note 131, at 89.
140. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445,452 (1957).
141. ADAM EPSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 95 (2003).
142. DOYICE COTTEN & JOHN T. WOLOHAN, LAW FOR RECREATION AND SPORT MANAGERS
273 (3d ed. 2003).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Jonathan Bell, Comment, Ticket Scalping: Same Old Problem with a Brand New Twist, 18
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cumulatively nets between $2 and $14 billion annually.... By comparison,
Ticketmaster, the world's largest primary ticket seller, sold 119 million tickets
valued at $6 billion in 2005."146
Although it may carry with it some negative implications, the profitability
of ticket scalping has made the practice more or less unavoidable. 147
Regardless of state regulations, promoters have realized that getting involved
in ticket scalping, or ticket reselling, may be a way of bringing in excess
profits. 148 A convenient conduit for this has frequently been the Internet,
especially when coupled with other technological advances.149  In fact,
"[w]hile the Internet has helped many sectors of the economy grow in ways
that were consistent with their pre-Internet model, the proliferation of online
ticket resale markets has changed the dynamic of how tickets to events are
distributed, especially for the most popular events."15 0
H. The MLB-StubHub Agreement
In August of 2007, MLB and StubHub, the ticket-reselling subsidiary of
eBay Inc., entered into a five-year agreement by which StubHub became
MLB's exclusive source for secondary ticket sales. 151 Under the agreement,
all individual MLB team websites, as well as the MLB.com website itself, link
those who wish to "sell their tickets or buy tickets from other fans to
Stubhub.com."l 52 With both parties sharing in revenue, the essence of the
deal is that "[b]uyers at StubHub.com pay a 10 percent fee, while sellers are
charged a 15 percent commission. If a baseball ticket sells for $100, the buyer
pays $110 and the seller pockets $85, so $25 would go to StubHub and the
baseball teams."153 The agreement does not necessarily mandate that all thirty
MLB teams utilize StubHub for their secondary ticket sales; however, if they
abstain, they are subsequently precluded from reselling their tickets online.154
Although the possibility of additional revenue would appear to be enough
to attract the franchises to the deal, the problem is that many clubs already
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 435, 439 (2006).
146. Id. at 439-40.
147. Id at 451-52.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 452.
150. Clark P. Kirkman, Note, Who Needs Tickets? Examining Problems in the Growing Online
Ticket Resale Industry, 61 FED. COMM. L. J. 739, 741 (2008-09).
151. Konrad, supra note 8.
152. Stone & Richtel, supra note 10.
153. Konrad, supra note 8.
154. Id.
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have contracts with other online secondary ticket sellers, such as
Ticketmaster. 155  Although MLB executives have tried to assuage
Ticketmaster's worries by claiming that no existing contracts would be
breached, Ticketmaster has "been known to resort to the courts when the
company believes its contracts are being violated."1 56
In July 2007, the company sued the NBA's Cleveland Cavaliers for
"offering season ticket holders another place to sell their tickets online."1 57
Unsurprisingly, the Cavaliers retaliated and brought an antitrust suit, claiming
that Ticketmaster was engaging in monopolistic practices.158 The court's
analysis never reached the merits of the antitrust claim for certain reasons
involving contract interpretation; 159 however, the fact that this suit was
brought should come as a warning for MLB.
Although currently protected by the baseball antitrust exemption, MLB
might be faced with antitrust issues in the future. Just as American Needle,
Inc. claimed that it was allegedly damaged by the NFL's granting of an
exclusive license to Reebok, Ticketmaster, or any other online ticket reseller,
might allege that MLB and its teams violated the antitrust laws by entering
into an exclusive agreement with StubHub. Further, it may attempt to propose
a reanalysis of the Federal Baseball holding, and given the technological
developments since 1922, such a reanalysis may be just what baseball needs.
I. What Would the Analysis Look Like?
Although concerted action was ultimately deemed to exist, when the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the American Needle case, the possibility that
the NFL might succeed in its single-entity defense became very real. As such,
MLB and its teams would most likely attempt to use this avenue of defense
should they be faced with an antitrust claim as a result of their agreement with
StubHub. While this would effectively evade scrutiny under section one of
the Sherman Act, section two challenges could still arise.
American Needle, Inc. alleged that the NFL defendants, through their
exclusive license with Reebok, were attempting to monopolize the licensing
and wholesale product markets. 160 Similarly, if the Supreme Court were to
entertain the idea of an antitrust exemption reanalysis, Ticketmaster would
155. Stone & Richtel, supra note 10.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.; Cavaliers Operating Co. v. Ticketmaster, Nos. 07CV2317 and 08CV240, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 93112. *12 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
159. Cavaliers Operating Co., at *27 n.14.
160. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2008).
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allege that MLB, in making StubHub its exclusive online ticket reseller, was
attempting to monopolize professional baseball's ticket market in violation of
section two.
To successfully bring a claim under section two of the Sherman Act, the
plaintiff must not show only that there is a threat of actual monopolization'61
but also that said monopolistic power was obtained through "improper or
predatory means."1 62  Similar to the claims brought by the plaintiffs in
Federal Baseball, Ticketmaster would allege that the defendants conspired to
induce all the MLB clubs to exclusively use StubHub for online secondary
ticket sales and that, in turn, Ticketmaster was significantly damaged.163 In
support of its claims and quite possibly demonstrating "improper or predatory
means," Ticketmaster could point to the fact that, if a MLB team chooses not
to participate in the agreement, the club is then precluded from reselling its
tickets online altogether.1 64 In Federal Baseball, the plaintiff's demise was
not due to inadequacies in its claims but rather the fact that the Court of
Appeals determined that baseball did not come within the antitrust laws.165
Thus, the Supreme Court would similarly entertain Ticketmaster's claims and
begin its analysis by determining whether the business of baseball now
sufficiently falls within antitrust regulation.
J. Baseball: It Ain't What it Used to Be
Were the Court to reassess the antitrust exemption, the chances of it
coming to the same conclusion are slim to none. Although the actual game of
baseball may not have changed that much since Federal Baseball, the sport as
a whole has become entirely different. Taking into consideration the
technological advances and developments within the business of baseball since
1922, a reexamination of the baseball antitrust exemption, especially in light
of the MLB-StubHub deal, may finally give the Supreme Court enough of a
reason to lift the exemption and expose baseball to the same antitrust
regulations to which every other professional sport has been subject.
Another reason that the StubHub deal may be cause for concern is that it
appears to go against what the antitrust exemption seeks to prevent.
Proponents of the antitrust exemption frequently base their arguments on the
161. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-69 (1984).
162. Anderson, supra note 12, at 128 n.32.
163. See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'1 League of Prof 1 Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 207-08 (1922).
164. See Konrad, supra note 8.
165. See Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 207-08.
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need for competitive balance. 166 For instance, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that professional sports leagues have a "strong and unique
interest in maintaining competitive balance among its teams."1 67 That interest
arises from a need to maintain fan appeal and, more importantly,
profitability.168 If the outcome of a sporting event becomes predictable, fans
will lose interest and, subsequently, profits will decrease; thus, "professional
sports leagues require special treatment under the antitrust laws . . .. An
antitrust exception ... is necessary to create the on-the-field competition that
draws fans."1 69
At first glance, this argument appears to open the doors for another Justice
Holmes-type assertion that the exhibition of the game of baseball is separate
from the business aspects of the sport.170 However, even back in 1949, Judge
Learned Hand alluded to the fact that baseball could no longer be separated
from its interstate features as they were no longer "merely incident" to the
business.' 7 ' Then in 1970, in Salerno v. American League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, it was further acknowledged that "changes in the economics
of the sport even since Toolson, especially the increasing importance of
revenues from interstate television broadcasts, make baseball's immunity from
the antitrust laws more anomalous than ever." 172
Nowadays, the ultimate goal of all professional sports leagues is to "attract
as many people as possible to pay money to attend games. .. ,"173 something
that is quite difficult to do without taking advantage of available television and
radio broadcasts or online ticket services. 174 The increasing number of games
played and the significant amount of emphasis placed on revenues from the
Internet, television, and radio has consequently brought about a rise in the
potential for section two claims.175 With this in mind, it becomes increasingly
166. Salil K. Mehra & T. Joel Zuercher, Striking Out "Competitive Balance" in Sports, Antitrust,
andIntellectual Property, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.1499, 1500 (2006).
167. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976).
168. Mehra & Zuercher, supra note 166, at 1500.
169. Id.
170. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'I Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 209 (1922).
171. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1949).
172. Salerno v. Am. League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970).
173. Ivy Ross Rivello, Note, Sports Broadcasting in an Era of Technology: Superstations, Pay-
Per- View, and Antitrust Implications, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 182 (1998) (quoting N. Am. Soccer
League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d. Cir 1982)).
174. See id.; but also see Bell, supra note 145, at 439-40 (explaining that the business of online
ticket sales is extremely lucrative).
175. Rosenbaum, supra note 138, at 797.
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more appropriate to say that baseball, as all other professional sports, is
sufficiently involved in interstate commerce, and as such, were the MLB-
StubHub deal to spawn another Supreme Court antitrust exemption analysis,
the exemption would be repealed.
II. CONCLUSION
The antitrust exemption has long, deep roots within professional baseball.
Federal Baseball ultimately paved the way by separating the actual game of
baseball from all other business aspects, making it extremely difficult for
future plaintiffs to bring antitrust claims. Although many have tried, courts
have refused to repeal the exemption, stating that such a change needs to be
made at the legislative level. Interestingly enough, Congress responds with
similar inaction, not wanting to "rock the boat" if the courts have continued to
find justification for upholding the exemption for this long. However, one
would be naYve to think that the sport side of professional baseball could still
be separated from the business side in the way it was in 1922. With new
technological advances emerging almost every day, baseball revenues have
become more and more dependent on utilizing these various methods. Those
franchises that choose not to utilize these methods for one reason or another
often get left behind, losing out on opportunities to expand their fan base.
With the online ticket selling and reselling industry impacting all
professional sports, regulation is imperative. Ultimately, this should require
antitrust regulation across the board. Professional baseball can no longer be
divided into sport and business, and as such, especially with the
materialization of MLB's deal with StubHub, a repeal of the antitrust
exemption should be considered. Judge Friendly very blatantly demonstrated
his disapproval of the antitrust exemption when he stated that "[w]e freely
acknowledge our belief that Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice
Holmes's happiest days, that the rationale of Toolson is extremely dubious and
that, to use the Supreme Court's own adjectives, the distinction between
baseball and other professional sports is 'unrealistic,' 'inconsistent' and
'illogical."'l 76  With this acknowledgement of the impropriety of the
exemption, especially taken in light of all the developments in baseball since
the years of the antitrust exemption's trilogy of cases, lifting the exemption
could be the only way Congress and the courts can hold on to the competitive
balance upon which all sports rely to be successful.
176. Salerno, 429 F.2d at 1005 (quoting Radovich v. Nat'1 Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452
(1957)).
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